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[937] 
The Duty of Good Faith: 
A Perspective on Contemporary Contract Law 
Jay M. Feinman* 
A duty of good faith performance inheres in every contract. Many courts get the contours 
and application of the duty of good faith wrong. These courts’ restrictive approach ties 
the good faith duty too closely to the express terms of the contract, requires subjective bad 
faith to violate the duty, and narrowly defines the standards of conduct that good faith 
requires. 
 
This Article, presented at a symposium in honor of Charles Knapp, describes the senses 
in which the courts get good faith wrong: doctrinal, historical, structural, and 
political/ideological. In doing so, it applies the critical legal studies approach to the duty 
of good faith and to contemporary contract law in general. The Article concludes by 
suggesting the political and ideological significance of the courts’ approach to good faith 
as emblematic of a classical revival in contract law.  
 
 * Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law, Camden. For Chuck Knapp, who 
modeled how to be a member of a scholarly community. 
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One of the features of Chuck Knapp’s scholarship that has always 
delighted me is how he links exhaustive and careful analysis of doctrine 
and cases with broader intellectual and historical themes. In this Article, 
I want to emulate that approach by looking at the ways in which many 
courts apply a particular doctrine of contract law and then expand the 
analysis to consider why they do that and what it means. In the more 
expansive task, I return to the Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”) 
movement’s examination of law and legal reasoning in general and of 
contract law in particular, a project to which I contributed and with which 
Knapp engaged. Although CLS is less prominent in scholarly discourse 
than it used to be, now some three decades after its heyday, it still 
provides the greatest insight about law available. 
I.  Good Faith 
This Article examines the obligation of good faith, which, as the 
aphorism states, is implied in every contract. Following its modern 
reformulation by Robert Summers,1 the duty of good faith and fair dealing 
was enshrined in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 205. 
The black letter of the Restatement did not define the content of the 
duty, but the comments suggested its scope: 
[G]ood faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes 
faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the 
justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types 
of conduct characterized as involving “bad faith” because they violate 
community standards of decency, fairness, or reasonableness.2 
Good faith is also a requirement in the performance of every contract 
within the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”).3 The 2001 amendments 
to Article 1 added “observance of reasonable commercial standards of 
fair dealing” to the general definition of good faith in order to supplement 
“honesty in fact,” a requirement that had previously been included only 
in the Article 2 definition.4 
 
 1. See Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 195, 196 (1968). See also Robert S. Summers, The General 
Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 810 (1982). 
 2. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a (1985). 
 3. U.C.C. § 1-203 (2001). 
 4. Compare id. § 1-201(20), with id. §§ 1-201(19), 2-103(1)(b). 
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In a recent article, I argued that many courts misconceive the 
doctrine and therefore make three errors in applying it.5 First, they tie 
the obligation of good faith too closely to the express terms of the 
contract. Some courts refuse to apply the doctrine where there is a facial 
conflict beyond the asserted good faith duty and an express term of the 
contract. Other courts require that the good faith obligation be applied 
to an express term of the contract, holding that good faith has no 
independent office except to give meaning to an express term. The Utah 
Supreme Court gave a succinct and stark expression of these limitations 
in Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc.: 
While a covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in almost every 
contract, some general principles limit the scope of the covenant . . . . 
First, this covenant cannot be read to establish new, independent rights 
or duties to which the parties did not agree ex ante. Second, this 
covenant cannot create rights and duties inconsistent with express 
contractual terms. Third, this covenant cannot compel a contractual 
party to exercise a contractual right “to its own detriment for the 
purpose of benefitting another party to the contract.” Finally, we will 
not use this covenant to achieve an outcome in harmony with the 
court’s sense of justice but inconsistent with the express terms of the 
applicable contract.6 
Second, courts hold that the only actionable type of breach of good 
faith is an intentional or reckless violation of the standards of behavior—
that is, subjective bad faith. Under this view, dishonesty in service of 
opportunism is the sole measure of bad faith. Even though they may cite 
the objective standards of the Restatement, these courts require subjective 
bad faith characterized by ill motive or intention. In In re Magna Cum 
Latte, Inc.—for example, a bankruptcy judge summarized California law 
to require, for a court to find that a party to the contract had breached its 
duty of good faith,  
a failure or refusal to discharge contractual responsibilities, prompted 
not by an honest mistake, bad judgment or negligence but rather by a 
conscious and deliberate act, which unfairly frustrates the agreed common 
purposes and disappoints the reasonable expectations of the other party 
thereby depriving that party of the benefits of the agreement.7 
Third, in describing the standard for good faith, courts define the 
parties’ contract and their objectives narrowly, and therefore limit the 
sources and scope of the good faith obligation. One vehicle for this 
narrow approach is Steven Burton’s “foregone opportunities” concept, 
which limits the scope of good faith to not attempting, during the 
performance of one’s contractual obligations, to recapture opportunities—
 
 5. Jay M. Feinman, Good Faith and Reasonable Expectations, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 525 (2014). 
 6. Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, 104 P.3d 1226, 1240 (citations omitted) (quoting 
Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr. v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., 889 P.2d 445, 457 n.13 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
 7.  No. 07-31814, 2007 WL 4412143, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2007) (citation omitted). 
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defined in limited economic terms—foregone at the time of contracting.8 
The hypothetical contract approach, featured in a series of Seventh 
Circuit cases by Judges Posner and Easterbrook are similar. These cases 
limit good faith to “a stab at approximating the terms the parties would 
have negotiated had they foreseen the circumstances that have given rise 
to their dispute” in order to achieve efficiencies that the parties, as 
rational maximizers, would have agreed to at the time of contracting, 
such as “minimiz[ing] the costs of performance” by “reducing defensive 
expenditures.”9 
Courts commit these errors because they fail to appreciate how good 
faith, properly understood, gives effect to the basic principle underlying all 
of contract law. As stated by Corbin in the initial section of his treatise, 
“The main purpose of contract law is the realization of reasonable 
expectations induced by promises.”10 The logic and purpose of the legal 
enforcement of reasonable expectations is to provide security to parties 
in their transactions, promote commerce, enable value-maximizing 
transactions, and all of the other banal reasons discussed in a first-year 
Contracts course. 
The duty of good faith gives effect to the principle of reasonable 
expectations in cases in which the court wishes to consider the possibility 
of contractual obligation, but finds the express terms of the contract too 
limited or too indistinct to form the basis of obligation. Good faith rests 
on the recognition that contracting parties will incompletely specify their 
obligations because of the limits of language and the inevitably finite 
nature of bargaining. Therefore, in some cases, good faith determines the 
extent of obligation arising from an express term by cabining the 
discretion that the term vests in a party. In other cases, good faith is 
further removed from an express term but protects reasonable expectations 
by giving “business efficacy” to an arrangement that is “instinct with an 
obligation” even though not tied to a particular contract term, as Judge 
Cardozo suggested in cases such as Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon.11 
Courts err when they fail to properly apply the reasonable 
expectations principle in good faith cases. First, because reasonable 
expectations arise not only from express terms but also from implied 
terms and the context in which the contract is made, limitations on good 
faith that give too great a weight to express terms are wrong. The 
obligation of good faith rests on reasonable expectations that can create 
duties that go beyond those specified in the express terms of the contract, 
 
 8. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 
94 Harv. L. Rev. 369, 373 (1980). 
 9. Mkt. St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 10. Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 1 (1952). 
 11. 118 N.E. 214, 214–15 (N.Y. 1917) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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including even duties that limit a party’s ability to exercise rights 
apparently created by the express terms. 
Second, because parties expect that their contracting partners will act 
consistently, with reasonable commercial standards of behavior, requiring 
subjective bad faith is wrong because it conflicts with reasonable 
expectations. That is, of course, why the U.C.C. requires as elements of 
good faith, both the subjective requirement of “honesty in fact” and the 
objective requirement of adherence to “reasonable commercial standards 
of fair dealing.”12 
Third, because reasonable expectations arise from words, conduct, and 
context in complex ways—“community standards of decency, fairness or 
reasonableness,”13—it is wrong to restrict good faith by conceptions of 
parties as constricted value maximizers who simply seek to prevent 
opportunistic behavior or to minimize the joint costs of their relationship. 
Instead, the proper standard for good faith reaches far beyond such 
narrow contours to include business sense and community standards. 
Accordingly, properly understood as an application of the reasonable 
expectations principle in cases in which express terms are insufficient to 
the task, good faith imposes broad obligations beyond those imposed by 
the express terms, and those obligations include adherence to commercial 
standards of reasonableness external to the express terms. Courts err when 
they fail to apply those principles in applying the doctrine of good faith. 
II.  Doctrine 
Thus, my argument is that a large number of courts get the definition 
and application of the duty of good faith wrong. It is part of the law 
professors’ conceit that, being removed from the press of deciding 
individual cases and having the luxury of time, we can see things more 
clearly than judges can, which allows us to see where they have gone astray 
and lead them back to the proper path. Well, maybe. But, it is certainly 
true that professors have the time, luxury, and professionally induced desire 
to look at doctrinal issues in broader perspective. This Article aims to 
provide that perspective by exploring in what sense the courts are wrong 
and why I am right, so as to give a better picture of the duty of good faith 
and its role in contemporary contract law. 
The first sense in which the courts have gone wrong is in traditional 
doctrinal analysis, as described in the previous section. In identifying 
these errors and suggesting how to correct them, my argument is novel in 
substance but familiar in form. The legal rule or standard that a party 
must act in good faith is supported by a principle: the principle of 
reasonable expectations. The principle of reasonable expectations, in 
 
 12. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2001). 
 13. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a (1985). 
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turn, contains a deeper set of principles and policies, namely that courts 
should enforce obligations that are implicit in parties’ agreements, parties 
are assumed to act honestly and in accordance with general norms of 
behavior, and so on. The scope of the principles and policies determine the 
proper application of the duty to act in good faith. In applying the rule, 
courts have failed to carry through the logic and purpose of the principle. 
There is a proper application of that logic and purposes—my approach to 
good faith—which would correct courts’ errors. 
This doctrinal argument should be persuasive to courts and lawyers. 
It proceeds from the common ground of the basis of contract law and 
develops rules, subrules, and applications that decide cases in reasonable 
ways. 
III.  History 
A second sense in which courts get the law of good faith wrong is in 
a historical sense. The restrictive approach to good faith is out of step 
with the development of contract law over the last century or so. The 
history of contract law in that period began with the classical conception, 
which dominated legal thinking in America from about 1870 to 1920. 
Thereafter, classical law was subjected to sustained critique, which, by 
the 1970s, produced a new body of contract law conventionally known as 
“neoclassical.”14 Courts err when they fail to fully incorporate neoclassical 
principles into their analysis of good faith. 
Classical contract law conceived of contract as a field of private 
ordering in which parties created their own law by making promises and 
consenting to agreements, in contrast to public law, which involved the 
imposition of legal obligations by the state. This focus on consent was 
grounded in a conception of the social world as composed of independent, 
freedom-seeking individuals, each of whom avidly pursued his own self-
interest. The job of courts, accordingly, was to enforce the rights created by 
the parties’ contracts and to refrain from imposing obligation where it had 
not been assumed. This enforcement took place through the application of 
abstract, formal rules that defined the elements that give rise to a contract 
right. Faithful and mechanical application of these rules was thought to 
protect parties’ autonomy from judicial invasion and enable individuals to 
anticipate the legal consequences of their conduct and calculate the extent 
to which particular contracts might serve their self-interest.15 
 
 14. See generally Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 
28 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Feinman, Un-Making Law]; Jay M. Feinman, Critical 
Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 829 (1983) [hereinafter Feinman, Critical Approaches]. 
See also Peter Gabel & Jay M. Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in The Politics of Law: A 
Progressive Critique 497 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998). 
 15. Feinman, Un-Making Law, supra note 14, at 4–7. 
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The critique of classical contract law, which began with Corbin and 
Llewellyn and extended through their successors in American legal 
realism and beyond, demonstrated that contract law does not arise from 
the consent of the parties in a way that is self-executing. Instead, contract 
law is like tort law and judicial action is like legislative action, in that all 
necessarily involve public policy judgments. Those judgments must 
account for the fact that although people have individual desires and 
interests, they are not just freedom-seeking isolates; rather, they are 
social beings with the responsibilities and benefits that come from living 
in a collective society. Even in the world of commerce, exchange occurs 
in the context of relationships, relationships that are governed by social 
norms and law as much as or more than by consent. In such a world, the 
inadequacy of language and the complexity of facts preclude the 
possibility of a formal, rule-based body of doctrine.16 
The body of contract law that developed by the 1970s—the law of 
the U.C.C. and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the law described 
in the Farnsworth and Calamari and Perillo treatises17—is appropriately 
described as “neoclassical” because the elements of the critique supplement 
but do not supplant the classical elements. In the neoclassical conception, 
private parties act out of economic self-interest but they also recognize 
the legitimacy of commercial norms that do not always accord with their 
immediate self-interest. They consent to agreements that create and define 
the scope of their obligations, but agreements are founded only partly on 
consent; obligations also arise from raising expectations and inducing 
reliance in the absence of subjective assent. Parties specify the terms of their 
agreements, but incompletely, so their agreements require interpretation 
and gap filling by a variety of doctrines. And so on.18 
This historical account restates the doctrinal argument in a different 
perspective. The error courts commit in restricting good faith is not simply 
an error in applying principle to rule, but also denies the historical process 
that has shaped modern contract law. Good faith in neoclassical law is an 
important supplementary and gap-filling doctrine, and courts need to 
recognize its value and expansive contours. Parties rarely specify in their 
agreements that they must observe honesty in fact and reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing, to use the U.C.C.’s terms, but the 
obligation to do so is generally if implicitly understood. Performance and 
even termination provisions vest parties with discretion but do not define 
all of the limits on that discretion; and good faith provides limits beyond 
those specified. Even beyond filling out the express terms of the contract, 
 
 16. Id. at 9–10. 
 17. See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts (3d ed. 2004); John D. 
Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, Calamari and Perillo on Contracts (6th ed. 2009).  
 18.  Feinman, Un-Making Law, supra note 14, at 13–15; Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract 
Theory, 58 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 1283, 1287–89 (1990). 
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good faith instantiates the obligation to act in accordance with the norms 
of business. 
IV.  Structure 
A third sense in which the courts get good faith wrong becomes 
apparent by translating the historical account into a structural account of 
the nature of contract law. From this perspective, courts err in narrowly 
applying good faith by denying something fundamental about the 
purpose and nature of contract law. 
The structural account translates the historical narrative of classicism/ 
critique/neoclassicism into a conflict between two images or visions of 
contract law.19 Much of the problem of classicism, according to the critique, 
was excess, not error. Furthering individual interests is important, but so 
is promoting communal values. Rules are desirable but not always 
realizable so they must be leavened with standards. Private ordering 
through the market is valuable but requires correction by state regulation. 
And so on. Therefore, it is necessary to determine appropriate rules and 
achieve correct results, given both sets of principles. 
In conventional terms, the classical model is referred to as 
“individualist,” and the principles of the critique “collectivist,” “social,” 
or, even in some versions, “communitarian.” Individualist principles 
express the importance of the individual, the value of choice, and the 
importance of private ordering with limited legal intervention only to 
protect recognized and established rights. Collectivist principles embody 
the importance of community, the value of responsibility, and the role of 
law in the service of public values. 
Just as the models of classicism and critique (and neoclassical law, 
for that matter) are somewhat stylized and abstracted, so, too, are the 
models of individualism and collectivism. These are interpretive 
understandings of large bodies of discourse. Each of the models coheres, 
in the sense that their elements stick together, but the elements are not 
logically deduced from fundamental principles. In fact, both models share 
important elements and techniques, and every legal actor believes in, and 
from time to time will express, elements of each.20 No one believes, for 
example, that the needs of the many always outweigh the needs of the 
few or the one, or, vice versa, that needs of an individual always outweigh 
the needs of the community.21 
 
 19. See generally Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, supra note 18; Feinman, Critical 
Approaches, supra note 14, at 839–44. 
 20. See Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication {FIN DE SIÈCLE} 49 (1997) [hereinafter 
Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication]; Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 
28 Buff. L. Rev. 209, 211–13 (1979) [hereinafter Kennedy, Structure of Blackstone]. 
 21. Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, supra note 20, at 46–50. 
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A few physical metaphors may be helpful. One way to envision 
contract law is through a core and periphery model. The critique of 
classical law did not argue that the individualist core of classical thought 
was false, but only that it was incomplete. Individualism, the power of 
consent, the importance of private ordering, and the desire for formal 
adjudication are important values in American society; the essence of the 
critique was that these values were not the whole story. Therefore, 
contract law maintains an individualist core with a periphery of 
collectivism. 
In the core/periphery model, the explicit terms of an agreement 
constitute the core of contractual obligation, but explicit terms are never 
the entirety of the parties’ agreement. Some things are understood though 
left unsaid, some things would be agreed to if considered, and some 
things are built in through the background of context and norms that 
envelop any agreement. Under this conception, the errors courts make in 
the constricted good faith cases are to understate or ignore entirely the 
presence of the periphery. 
A different and more expansive way to envision contract law is as a 
balance between elements of individualism and elements of collectivism. 
The balance can shift from time to time and from issue to issue so one 
side can outweigh but should never overwhelm the other. In the balance 
metaphor, the values of private ordering and enforcing only the terms 
the parties have chosen to include in their agreement need to be balanced 
against the recognition that agreements are more broadly constituted 
than the express terms reveal. Moreover, parties should, in any event, be 
held to community standards of reasonableness. Courts err when they tip 
the balance too far in the individualist direction. From this perspective, 
courts err in the good faith cases by tipping the scales too far in favor of 
express terms and against standards of reasonableness. 
The structural account suggests that courts get good faith wrong in 
favoring individualist values over collectivist values when defining and 
applying good faith. That there is a wrong answer suggests that there is a 
right answer and a method for distinguishing between right and wrong. 
Contemporary law suggests that in fact, there is a method for resolving 
conflicts, whether drawing the boundary between core and periphery or 
weighing values in achieving a proper balance. Rules are formulated and 
cases decided using a mix of deductive reasoning and policy analysis. 
Particular rules and results may be controversial and disputed, but there 
is general agreement that courts are capable of formulating rules and 
deciding cases in a relatively noncontroversial way; when they get the 
results wrong, as they sometimes do, it is only because they have applied 
the common law method improperly, not that the method itself is flawed. 
Therefore, the error of courts in the good faith cases is little more than 
an error in doctrinal analysis writ large. 
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The problem with this analysis, from the critical perspective, is that 
it ignores the indeterminacy critique.22 In the critical perspective, 
doctrine is radically indeterminate. A single principle or policy can be 
used to support opposite conclusions, and a principle or policy can 
typically be countered by a different principle or policy.23 
Without restating the entire indeterminacy critique in all its versions 
here, think about reasonable expectations. The definition of reasonable 
expectations is in part a normative process. How do we tell what 
expectations are reasonable, which means what expectations should be 
reasonable? In defining what expectations are reasonable, when should 
courts favor individualist values or collectivist norms? Having selected 
one set of values, in which direction do they lead? And in attempting to 
balance the values, what is the measure that enables the court to do so 
objectively? Corbin attempted to provide an answer: 
It must not be supposed that contract problems have been solved by 
the dictum that expectations must be “reasonable.” Reasonableness is 
no more absolute in character than is justice or morality. Like them, it 
is an expression of the customs and mores of men—the customs and 
mores that are themselves complex, variable with time and place, 
inconsistent and contradictory.24 
Knapp attacked the CLS indeterminacy critique, suggesting that this 
way of thinking about contract law and associated work proposing a 
relational contract theory is “no more ‘determinate’ than the contract 
law we have now . . . a scant improvement.”25 Yes and no. “Yes,” in that 
if the indeterminacy critique is correct, these new approaches would not 
be capable of giving more certain results in particular cases. That is 
exactly the point of the critique, and if it is correct, that is just the way 
the world is. But “no” in that the lack of determinacy does not mean a 
lack of insight.26 It is in that perspective that there is a political or 
ideological sense in which the courts are wrong in the good faith cases. 
The errors courts commit in restricting the application of good faith are 
not isolated or random. Instead, they are part of a much broader 
approach to restricting contract law over the past quarter century—a 
classical revival in contract law. 
 
 22. The same problem is present in neoclassical law’s incorporation of the critique as a corrective 
to neoclassicism. See Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 14, at 846–47. 
 23. The literature is voluminous. For concise statements, see, for example, Feinman, The Significance 
of Contract Theory, supra note 18, at 1312–13; John Henry Schlegel, Of Duncan, Peter, and Thomas 
Kuhn, 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1061, 1065 (2000); Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 
40 Stan. L. Rev. 611, 624 n.40 (1988). 
 24. Corbin, supra note 10, at 2. 
 25. Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 Hastings L.J. 
1191, 1233 (1998). 
 26. The CLS approach has “done much in this postmodern period to nudge the complacent rest 
of us to at least imagine, if only briefly, the possibility of better worlds than this one.” Id. at 1232. 
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The core principle of the classical revival restores the emphasis on 
contract law to private law, both to enhance personal autonomy and to 
facilitate the operation of the unfettered market as the essential social 
institution. Richard Epstein summed up the approach: 
[Contract] law can facilitate (not compel, but facilitate) sizable 
productive interactions which will continue to expand over time and 
transactions until they embrace all individuals who possess the 
minimum capacity to engage in contracting at all. The system goes 
forward in a benevolent fashion because the exchanges are mutually 
beneficial. . . . The background knowledge of the uniform incentives 
moving self-interested parties is a more reliable guide to their interests 
than any public vetting of their deal.27 
Therefore, the role of contract law is to enforce the bargains that parties 
have made, not extend obligation beyond those bargains or bring public 
values such as commercial reasonableness to bear in assessing their 
validity. Formality reigns, both in the formulation of rules of contract law 
and in the preference for clear expressions in parties’ contracts. Epstein 
again (and one can hardly tell when Epstein is being hyperbolic): “For all 
its minor differences, and with a little refurbishing at the edges, we could 
do as well with the Roman law of contract as we do with any modern 
system dedicated to the principle of freedom of contract, as our system 
too often is not.”28 The classical revival resonates throughout contract 
law. I offer only a few examples, about each of which Knapp has written. 
Standard form contracts in paper and electronic form are, of course, 
the dominant mode of contracting today. To use Knapp’s phrase, the 
classical revival aims to treat form contracts as “sacred cows” rather than 
“dangerous animals, likely to do harm unless confined and tamed.”29 
Through such contracts, dominant contracting parties bind their customers 
without meaningful assent, notice, or opportunity to pursue other terms. 
For example, a forum-selection clause included in fine print as the eighth 
of twenty-five numbered paragraphs on a cruise line ticket sent to the 
passenger only after the passenger had made a nonrefundable payment 
constitutes assent, according to the Supreme Court.30 Ordering a computer 
system and paying for it with a credit card does not constitute a purchase 
where a piece of paper shipped in the box with the computer specifies 
otherwise, according to the Seventh Circuit.31 As Stewart Macaulay 
 
 27. Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 78–79 (1995). 
 28. Id. at 327. 
 29. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 Fordham 
L. Rev. 761, 789 (2002). 
 30. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). See Charles L. Knapp, Contract Law 
Walks the Plank: Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 12 Nev. L.J. 553, 554 (2012). 
 31. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148–49 (7th Cir. 1997); see also ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1446, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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explained the theory of these cases, “misrepresentation is the oil that 
lubricates capitalism.”32 
At the other end of the contracting process, the point of dispute, the 
classical revival’s reverence for expressed assent and disdain for judicial 
intervention has resulted in the routine enforcement of contact terms that 
supplant the legal system as a dispute resolution mechanism.33 Predispute, 
dominant parties use mandatory arbitration clauses to deny consumers 
effective review of the form, substance, or performance of their contracts, 
as in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.34 The selection of arbitration to 
the exclusion of litigation, the designation of an arbitral forum, and any 
limitations on the scope of arbitration are routinely enforced, and the 
possibility of examining arbitration clauses for unconscionability or 
reviewing the results or an arbitration for error or worse have all but 
disappeared. 
In between those chronological poles, similar effects are evident in 
other doctrines. In neoclassical law, promissory estoppel offered the 
promise of a means of subverting the formal requirements of traditional 
contract law in many cases, making enforceable a promise on which 
someone relied, even if the promise did not meet the traditional standards 
for forming a contract.35 The classical revival’s emphasis on formality 
caused this to be “the revolution that wasn’t,” as characterized by Sidney 
DeLong.36 As with mandatory arbitration clauses, sophisticated parties 
use the limits of the doctrine as a way of avoiding responsibility for the 
promises they have made.37 
Courts’ restrictive approach to good faith is of a piece with these 
developments. Standard form contracts enable dominant parties to 
dictate terms, and the decline of reliance-based liability allows them to 
deny responsibility for promises outside written contracts. Restrictive 
applications of good faith do the same, limiting obligations to express 
terms and precluding liability for expectations raised outside of the express 
 
 32. The Gateway Thread: AALS Contracts Listserv, 16 Touro L. Rev. 1147, 1149 (2000). 
 33. See generally Knapp, supra note 29; Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory 
Arbitration: Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 San Diego L. Rev. 609 (2009). 
 34. See text accompanying note 30. 
 35. For a review, see generally Knapp, supra note 25. 
 36. Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial Promissory 
Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 943, 943. 
 37. For example, DeLong catalogued examples of employer statements that do not rise to the 
level of promises, including:  
“You will be here until you retire”; . . . “You will not have to be concerned 
about job security because you have a job here as long as you want or until you 
retire”; . . . “You will have a job until you retire; we’ll have you for the next 
twelve years”; “Your position will never be taken away and you can have it as 
long as you want it”; “You have full-time, permanent employment”; “I don’t see 
a problem with you working until you are sixty-five.”  
Id. at 1004–05. 
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terms. Mandatory arbitration clauses remove contract cases from the 
sphere of public lawmaking through adjudication, and narrowing good 
faith focuses on the private and the internal, rather than the public and 
the objective. 
V.  Ideology and Politics 
The restrictive approach to good faith is part of a classical revival in 
contract law, and that movement is part of a transformation in private 
law generally.38 In tort law, the classical revival reinstates traditional 
notions of fault and corrective justice in place of the neoclassical 
emphasis on compensation and collective justice. Personal responsibility 
is seen as a focus on the conduct of the injured and not the wrongdoing 
of injurers, with a goal of unburdening market entrepreneurs. The 
optimal balance of safety and injury is to be achieved through market 
forces rather than through legal liability. As a result, the generalization 
of negligence that characterized the neoclassical expansion of tort law is 
abandoned and new immunities and special liability rules are established, 
products liability abandons the move toward strict liability in favor of a 
pure negligence regime, and damages are cut back. In property law, the 
notion that property constitutes “a natural and unique set of 
entitlements” replaces the idea the “property serves human values.” 
Most notably, the law of takings has expanded as a protection against 
government action that limits individual property rights in pursuit of the 
collective good. 
There is a puzzle here. The classical revival restates, in modern 
guise, the position of classical law, a position that was critiqued—proven 
wrong—by a half century or more of scholarship and lawmaking. In 1943, 
Robert Hale explained why freedom of contract was a bankrupt concept, 
yet the concept has become a rallying cry in the new generation.39 Corbin, 
Llewellyn, Hohfeld, Hale, and other scholars, and Cardozo, Traynor, and 
other judges demonstrated the emptiness of formalism so only a 
sophisticated mix of policy and doctrine could address the complexities 
of commercial transactions, yet Epstein is taken seriously in arguing that 
there are “Simple Rules for A Complex World.”40 How is this possible? 
The answer is ideological, which is to say it is political, and that 
demonstrates that the courts are wrong in the good faith cases in a much 
deeper sense than ignoring history or slighting collectivist values. The 
classical revival of contract law is part of the campaign by political 
 
 38. See Feinman, Un-Making Law, supra note 14, at 1–2. 
 39. See generally Robert Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, 22 Colum. L. 
Rev. 209, 214 (1922). 
 40. Epstein, supra note 27, at 78–79. 
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conservatives and business interests to reshape American government, 
law, and society.41 
Ronald Reagan proclaimed the principal item on the agenda of this 
campaign most baldly in his first inaugural address: “Government is not 
the solution to our problems; government is the problem.”42 Government 
is the problem because it interferes with individual freedom, particularly 
the individual freedom to pursue self-interest through the market. If 
government is the problem, then the solution is to reduce the reach of 
government, including the part of government that exercises authority 
through the common law. The ability to contract and to have obligation 
limited to the contracts one has made are essential conditions of 
freedom, so the role of courts must be to enforce express terms, not to 
add to them or to assess their reasonableness through doctrines such as 
good faith.43 
With this emphasis on personal freedom, contract law becomes 
envisioned as nonpolitical. It lies within the realm of corrective justice, 
righting wrongs between individuals according to objective principles of 
law, as contrasted with the political choices made in electoral politics and 
in legislation. And back to CLS, in the view of which this position is 
nonsense of a particularly pernicious kind. The nonsense is that contract 
law is essentially non-ideological. In fact, contract law, like all law, is 
deeply political and ideological. The most pernicious error of courts in the 
good faith cases, therefore, is the attempt to remove law from the realm 
of policy and politics.  
 
 
 
 41. See Feinman, Un-Making Law, supra note 14, at 56. 
 42. John B. Judis & Ruy Teixeira, The Emerging Democratic Majority 151–52 (2002) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 43. “Like other aspects of personal autonomy, [freedom of contract] is too easily smothered by 
government officials eager to tell us what’s best for us.” Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int’l, Inc., 872 F.2d 
312, 316 (9th Cir. 1989). 
